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JURISDICTION

This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide
appellants' appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Issue: Did the district court err in granting judgment against Pettit and

Glezos personally where the court found it an undisputed fact that these individuals were
acting on behalf of their respective of limited liability companies?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law
rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions.
The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according
deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 1994). A trial
court's decision not to pierce the corporate veil will be upheld if there is substantial
evidence in favor of the judgment." D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, f 21.
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Preserved: Defendants filed a timely
motion to set aside the judgment, for relief from the judgment and for a new trial. R. 584586.
2. Issue: Considering that it was an undisputed fact that Pettit and Glezos were
acting on behalf of their respective limited liability companies, did the trial court abused
its discretion by not requiring those entities to be joined as indispensable parties?
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Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of whether a party should be
joined to an action will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Green v. Louder,
2001 UT62,^[40.
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Preserved: Defendants filed a timely
motion to set aside the judgment, for relief from the judgment and for a new trial. R. 584586.
APPLICABLE STATUTES A N D RULES
UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(c).

(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary
judgment shall contain a statement of material facts as to which the
moving party contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set
forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding
party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment
shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's
facts that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of
additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that
is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to
supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
UTAH R. CIV. P. 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.

(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to
service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as a
2

party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (I) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of
his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall
order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and his
joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a
person as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made
a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as
indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include:
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the
shaping of relief, or other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence
will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.

UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56(c).
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
3

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 48-2c-601: General Rule.

Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, member,
manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under a
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a
debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or
omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member,
manager, or employee of the company.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

Plaintiff-appellee filed suit in connection with a Real Estate Purchase Agreement
(the "Agreement") between plaintiff-appellee and Defendant STC Holdings ("STC").
Plaintiff-appellee sought declaratory relief with respect to the meaning of certain
provisions of the Agreement. Plaintiff-appellee also asserted claims for breach of
contract, wrongful lien, quiet title, slander of title and interference with economic
relations. Plaintiff-appellee alleged that STC was a general partnership consisting of
Glezos and Pettit and therefore these individuals were personally liable.
Eventually, plaintiff-appellee and the district court determined that it was an
undisputed fact that Pettit and Glezos were not partners in STC but rather STC was a dba
of Land Solutions, LC and Glezos was its only member. It was also an undisputed fact
that Pettit was acting on behalf of 90th South Joint Venture, LLC. Nonetheless the district
court imposed personal liability on Pettit and Glezos.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Defendants answered the complaint, alleging as affirmative defenses, inter alia,
4

that Plaintiff had failed to join indispensable parties, namely Land Solutions, LC. Land
Solutions, LC, sought to intervene in the case. Defendants brought a motion asserting
that Defendant Pettit was not personally involved in the transaction and should be
dismissed. Discovery was conducted and, thereafter, plaintiff-appellee moved for
summary judgment against all Defendants which was granted. The order granting
summary judgment made a factual determination that Pettit and Glezos were acting on
behalf of their respective limited liability companies; however, the order imposed
personal liability on both Glezos and Pettit.
Thereafter, Defendants objected to the entry of judgment against Glezos and Pettit
personally and filed a motion styled "Motion to Set Aside Judgment, for Relief from
Judgment and for New Trial." Plaintiff filed its Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit in
Support of Award of Attorneys' Fees. Defendants' objected to the reasonableness of the
fees and filed a second post-judgment motion styled "Defendants' Supplemental Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment - Dismissal of Glen Pettit."
These post-judgment motions were pending when Defendants terminated their
legal counsel. New counsel was retained and Defendants' Rule 60(b) motion was filed.
C.

Disposition By Trial Court.

Having granted summary judgment and entered a judgment against defendants, a
hearing was held on (1) defendants' motion to set aside judgment, motion for relief from
judgment, motion for new trial and other relief; (2) defendants' objections to the award of
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attorneys' fees; (3) the pending supplemental motion for partial summary judgment,
seeking dismissal of Pettit; and (4) the Rule 60(b) motion filed by Defendants newly
retained counsel.
At the hearing, Defendants withdrew their objection to the reasonableness of the
attorneys' fees requested by Plaintiff-appellee's counsel and fees were awarded, as
requested. The trial court denied the Defendants' three pending motions and this appeal
followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

This action arises out of the Agreement for the purchase of certain real

property located in Davis County, Utah. The parties to the Agreement were the plaintiffappellee as seller and "STC Holdings or assigns" ("STC") as purchaser. R. 366-375.
2.

The Agreement provided for a specific purchase price for the real property,

which was to be adjusted for unuseable acreage. The dispute which lead to litigation
arose from the parties' different interpretations of the Agreement's provisions and
requirements concerning what constitutes "unuseable" acreage and the process by which
that acreage is to be determined. Passim.
3.

Purchaser, STC Holdings is a dba of Land Solutions, LC, which assigned

its interest the Agreement to 90th South Joint Venture, L.C. R. 575, 578.
4.

90th South Joint Venture, LLC, executed a settlement statement in an effort

to close on the property. R. 578.
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5.

Hence, Land Solutions, LC and 90 South Joint Venture, LLC together with

plaintiff-appellee were the only parties involved in the Agreement. R. 575, 578.
The Complaint
6.

In late 2005, a complaint was filed in which the Plaintiff-appellee named

STC, Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit as defendants. Glezos and Pettit were named in their
personal capacities as plaintiff-appellee incorrectly assumed STC was a general
partnership made up of these two individuals. R. 1-17.
7.

Obviously, plaintiff-appellee's complaint never alleged any that Glezos

and/or Pettit were alter egos of any corporate entity as the complaint never contemplated
the participation of limited liability companies. Id. Later the plaintiff-appellee would
eventually acknowledge that Glezos and Pettit acted on behalf of their respective limited
liability companies. R. 179-180.
The Answers and Affirmative Defense of Defendants
8.

STC and Glezos filed an Answer in which they raised the affirmative

defense of failure to join Land Solutions, LC, as an indispensable party. R. 25.
9.

Pettit filed an Answer and also raised the affirmative defense of failure to

join Land Solutions, LC, as an indispensable party. R. 101.
Land Solutions, LC's Motion to Intervene
10.

Shortly after STC and Glezos answered the complaint, Land Solutions, LC

filed a motion to intervene. R. 35-37. Plaintiff-appellee never filed a response to the
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motion to intervene. R. 39-40.
11.

About a month after the motion to intervene was filed a notice to submit the

motion for a decision was with the district court. Id.
12.

Shortly after the notice was filed, former counsel for defendants filed a

letter addressed to plaintiff-appellee's counsel. R. 41. This letter memorializes a
conversation defendants' counsel had with the district court clerk whereby the court via
the clerk granted Land Solutions' motion to intervene. Id.
13.

Plaintiff-appellee's counsel received the letter and proposed order. R. 685.

However, plaintiff-appellee did not agree that STC should be dismissed from the
litigation. Id.
14.

No order granting Land Solution, LC's motion to intervene was ever

entered.
Motion to Dismiss Pettit
15.

In early 2006, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Pettit from the

litigation, supported by the affidavit of Glezos. R. 105-109, 97-99, respectively.
16.

In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff asserted that STC was a

partnership made up of Pettit and Glezos. R. 165-166.
17.

Plaintiff-appellee also noted in its memorandum in opposition to the motion

to dismiss Pettit that:
a.

Pettit signed the settlement statement which accompanied the tender
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of the reduced purchase price on behalf of 90th South Joint Venture, the assignee of
STC Holdings (R. 166);
b.

Pettit signed a check for $10,000.00 which was submitted with the

settlement statement (Id.);
c.

Pettit, along with Glezos, ordered the survey commissioned in

connection with the purchase of the subject property (R. 167); and,
d.

that Pettit, along with Glezos, had conversations with an appraiser

and a surveyor about the property. Id..
18.

Defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on their Motion to

Dismiss Pettit (R. 470-471) prior to the entry of judgment but the motion was heard as a
post-judgment motion. R. 728-730.
Plaintiff-appellee's Successful Motion for Summary Judgment
19.

In its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff-appellee acknowledged that

STC was not a general partnership, but a dba for Land Solutions, LC, that Glezos was the
manager for STC and that Pettit was the manager of 90th South Joint Venture, LLC. R.
179-80. However, neither the plaintiff-appellee or the court sought to join these entities.
20.

Defendants responded to the motion for summary judgment, but did not

comply with the strict requirements of UTAH R. CIV. P. 7; specifically, defendants did not
repeat, verbatim, the statement of undisputed facts as alleged by the plaintiff-appellee and
specifically designate which facts were and were not admitted. R. 345-377.
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21.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff and

against all Defendants on September 25, 2007. The order makes no distinction between
the liability of the party to the contract, STC, and the individual members of the limited
liability companies involved in the transactions. R. 573-583.
22.

The order granting summary judgment states in pertinent part:
Defendant STC Holdings is a dba or trade name for Land
Solutions, L.C., a Utah limited liability company. Steve
Glezos is the registered agent and sole member of Land
Solutions, L.C. .. .Steve Glezos, acting as STC Holdings,
entered a contract [the breach of which is the basis for the
litigation] . . . .
Glen R. Pettit executed the Assignment of [the contract which
is the subject of the litigation] as the authorized agent and sole
member of 90th South Joint Venture, L.C, a Utah limited
liability company.

R. 575, 578.
23.

Although the order granting summary judgment contemplated allowing

defendants 15 days to object to plaintiff-appellee's attorneys' fees, (R. 581) the judgment
was entered immediately after the order granting summary judgment. R. 568-572.
24.

The judgment imposed a monetary award against Glezos and Pettit

personally in the amount of $115,736.26 which represented plaintiff-appellee's attorneys'
fees and costs. R. 569.
Post-Judgment Motions
25.

Defendants filed a timely motion to set aside the judgment, for relief from
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the judgment and for a new trial on October 10, 2006 (R. 584-586), objections to
proposed award of Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs (R. 587-596), supported by the
affidavit of former counsel for Defendants (R. 597-599), and a "supplemental motion for
partial summary judgment" regarding the dismissal of Pettit. (R. 600-604).
26.

Thereafter, a notice of substitution of defendants' counsel was filed,

together with a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b). R.
661-666.
27.

Thereafter, a hearing was held on the pending motion to dismiss Pettit, the

Defendants' objections to Plaintiffs affidavit of attorneys' fees and costs, Defendants'
motion to set aside the judgment, for relief from the judgment and for a new trial, and the
Rule 60(b) motion.1 /?. 770.
28.

At the hearing, the trial court denied all post-judgment motions of the

Defendants. After an effort by the parties to settle the matter, an order denying the
motions was entered on April 3, 2007. R. 728-730.
29.

Notice of Appeal was timely filed by Defendants. R. 732-733.

1

Defendants' counsel mistakenly hired a court reporter to attend the January 25,
2007 hearing and draft a transcript which was then filed with the court. Once counsel
learned this was an error he had an Official Court Reporter prepare and file a transcript.
Hence, the record on appeal contains two transcripts for the same hearing. Counsel
apologizes for his blunder.
11

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
An internally inconsistent order granting summary judgment was entered in this
case. On the one hand, it acknowledges that Pettit and Glezos were acting as agents of
limited liability companies. On the other hand, it imposes personal liability on Pettit and
Glezos in contravention of the general rule that agents are not personally liable for
judgments entered against the limited liability companies on whose behalf they serve.
The district court did this even though no facts were ever alleged which would provide a
basis to ''pierce the corporate veil" or otherwise support a judgment against Pettit and
Glezos personally. The entry of the summary judgment order was error.
Defendants submitted pleadings and made objections which at the very least put
plaintiff-appellee, as well as, the district court on notice that the real parties in interest
should be joined, Le., the limited liability companies on whose behalf Pettit and Glezos
were acting. Despite the submission of these pleading and the eventual determination by
the court that Pettit and Glezos were in fact acting as agents of limited liability
companies, the district court never cause those entities to be joined and refused to absolve
Pettit and Glezos of personal liability. This was an error.
Defendants seek to have the summary judgment order and judgment vacated. It
further seeks to have this case remanded with instructions to allow Land Solutions, LC
and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC to intervene, assert counterclaims, conduct discovery,
and join third-parties.

12

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PETTIT AND GLEZOS PERSONALLY WHERE IT FOUND
THEY WERE ACTING ON BEHALF OF LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." UTAH R. CIV.
P. 56. On review from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court
accords no deference to the trial court because entitlement to summary judgment is a
question of law. Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 2001 UT 16 at $12. It is the function of the
appellate court to determine whether the trial court erred in applying the law and whether
the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Kouris v.
Utah Highway Patrol 70 P.3d 32, 2003 UT 19 at f 2.
In its order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff-appellee the district court
found that there was no dispute regarding the following two facts:
[First,] Defendant STC Holdings is a dba or trade name for
Land Solutions, L.C., a Utah limited liability company. Steve
Glezos is the registered agent and sole member of Land
Solutions, L.C. . . .Steve Glezos, acting as STC Holdings,
entered a contract [the breach of which is the basis for the
litigation] . . . .
***

[Second,] Glen R. Pettit executed the Assignment of [the
contract which is the subject of the litigation] as the
authorized agent and sole member of 90th South Joint
Venture, L.C, a Utah limited liability company.
13

R. 575, 578.
Clearly, the district court found that Glezos and Pettit were acting on behalf of
their respective limited liability companies. However, it imposed judgment against them
personally rather than against their limited liability companies; this was an error.
Utah law protects organizers, members, managers and employees from personal
liability for actions taken while acting for the limited liability company.
Except as provided in Section 48-2c-602, no organizer, member,
manager, or employee of a company is personally liable under a
judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a
debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the acts or
omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member,
manager, or employee of the company.
UTAH CODE ANN. 48-2C-601 .

In order for the district court to have imposed person liability against Pettit and
Glezos the "complaint must plead [and the district court must find] a concurrence of two
circumstances: (1) there must be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., the corporation is,
in fact, the alter ego of one or a few individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate
form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow."
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan, 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979).
In the present case the complaint is devoid of any such allegations. As the
complaint makes clear, plaintiff-appellee was originally under the impression that STC
was a general partnership between Pettit and Glezos. R. 2. It logically follows that
14

plaintiff-appellees could never have sought to "pierce the corporate veil" because they
never realized that limited liability companies were involved.
Defendants plead the affirmative defense of failure to join and indispensable party.
R. 25, 101. Land Solutions, L.C., filed a motion to intervene. R. 35-37. Defendant Pettit
filed a motion seeking his dismissal from the litigation. R. 105-109. Eventually,
plaintiff-appellee acknowledged that both Pettit and Glezos were acting on behalf of their
respective limited liability companies (See plaintiff-appellee's motion for summary
judgement, R. 179, f l 3-4) and the district court found this to be an undisputed fact. R.
575, 578. However, plaintiff-appellee took no action whatsoever to join the limited
liability companies.
After entry of the $115,736.26 judgment, defendants timely filed a "Motion to Set
Aside Judgment, Motion for Relief from Judgment, Motion for a New Trial and for Other
Relief." R. 584-586. In that motion defendants clearly objected to Pettit's and Glezos'
personal liability. Id. Defendant Pettit further objected to his personal liability in his
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R. 600-604. Finally, new counsel for defendants
timely filed a motion under UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion. All of these motions were
denied. R. 728-730.
Because the summary judgment order is internally inconsistent - it both
acknowledges that Pettit and Glezos were acting on behalf of their respective limited
liability companies yet imposes personal liability on them - this Court should vacated the
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order.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT REQUIRING
JOINDER OF ENTITIES IT FOUND TO BE THE REAL PARTIES IN
INTEREST BUT RATHER IMPOSED PERSONAL LIABILITY ON THEIR
AGENTS IN CONTRAVENTION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 48-2C-601.
A party may raise the issue of failure to join an indispensable party for the first

time on appeal. Cassidy v. Salt Lake County Fire Civ. Serv. Council, 1999 UT App 65, f
9 (citations omitted). Joiner of parties is governed by UTAH R. CIV. P. 19, which states in
pertinent part:
A [limited liability company which] is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be joined as
a party in the action if... (2) [it] claims an interest relating to
the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in [its] absence may .. . leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by
reason of his claimed interest. If [it] has not been so joined,
the court shall order that [it] be made a party. [(Emphasis
added.)]
A trial court's determination of whether a party should be joined to an action will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62 , f 40.
Originally, plaintiff-appellee alleged that Pettit and Glezos were general partners
of STC Holdings. R. 2. Defendants took the following steps to address the issue of
defendants failure to join Land Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC:
1.

STC and Glezos filed an answer in which they raised
the affirmative defense of failure to join Land
Solutions, LC as an indispensable party. R. 25.
16

2.

Pettit filed an answer and also raised the affirmative
defense of failure to join Land Solutions, L.C. as an
indispensable party. R. 101.

3.

In their initial disclosures, defendants tendered a
settlement statement which clearly indicated that 90th
South Joint Venture was a relevant party. R. 94-96.

4.

Land Solutions, L.C. filed a motion to intervene. R.
35-37.

5.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Pettit from the
litigation. R. 105-109.

6.

Defendants filed a Notice to Submit for Decision on
their Motion to Dismiss Pettit prior to the hearing on
plaintiff-appellee's motion for summary judgment. R.
470-471.

7.

After the judgment was entered against defendants
they filed a timely motion to set aside the summary
judgment, for relief from the judgment and for a new
trial and in that motion reiterated that Land Solutions,
LC and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC were the real
parties in interest. R. 584-586.

8.

Again, defendants sought the dismissal of Pettit from
the litigation after entry of judgment. R. 600-604.

9.

Defendants timely filed a motion under UTAH R. CIV. P
60(b) seeking the nullification of the judgment on the
grounds that the real party in interest, Land Solutions,
LC was not joined. R. 661-666.

10.

At the hearing of post-judgment motions, defendants
offered to "roll over" the judgment against them should
Land Solutions, L.C. and 90th South Joint Venture,
L.L.C. be allowed to intervene in the case. In other
words, should it be determine that Land Solutions and
90th South Joint Venture were labile for the breach of
17

the Agreement the currently existing judgment against
them would be "rolled over" and added to the
subsequent judgment. R. 770, p.27-28.
Plaintiff-appellee acknowledged in its motion for summary judgment that indeed
Glezos and Pettit were acting on behalf of Land Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint
Venture. R. 179-180. It necessarily follows that these entities should have been joined as
parties yet, plaintiff-appellee never sought their joinder.
Based on plaintiff-appellee's summary judgment motion, the district court
ultimately found that Pettit and Glezos were acting on behalf of limited liability
companies, however, it imposed personal liability upon them nonetheless. At the postjudgment hearing the district court made much of the fact that defendants former counsel
did not comply with UTAH R. CIV. P. 7 and dispute the factual assertions of the plaintiffappellee. R. 770, p.3. However, defendants agreed the fact that both Pettit and Glezos
were acting in their corporate capacity and therefore immune from judgment by operation
of UTAH CODE ANN. 48-2c-601.
Upon recognizing the capacity in which Glezos and Pettit were involved in this
transaction the district court should have ordered the joinder of Land Solutions, LC and
90th South Joint Venture, LLC. Instead, the court imposed personal liability on Pettit and
Glezos; this was error.
Defendants respectfully request that this Court remand this case with instructions
to the district court that Land Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC be joined
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and given an opportunity to conduct discovery, assert counterclaims and join third-parties.
CONCLUSION
It was error for the district court to enter an internally inconsistent order which,
one the one hand, acknowledged that Pettit and Glezos were at all relevant times acting in
their capacity as agents of limited liability companies, yet on the other hand, imposed
personal liability on them. Further, Land Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint Venture,
LLC should have been joined as parties because the undisputed facts in the order granting
summary judgment clearly detail their involvement.
Defendants respectfully request that this Court vacated the judgment and summary
judgment order and remand this case with instructions to the district court that Land
Solutions, LC and 90th South Joint Venture, LLC be joined and given an opportunity to
conduct discovery, assert counterclaims and join third-parties.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

13th day of November, 2007.

WALTER T. KEANE

Attorney for the Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing Appellants' Opening Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this
November, 2007, to the following:

Milo Stephen Marsden
Patricia C. Staible
DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HORTON V. BOURNE PARTNERSHIP,
LTD., a Utah limited partnership,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 050603171
STC HOLDINGS, a Utah general
partnership; STEVE GLEZOS, an
individual; and GLEN PETTIT, an
individual,

Judge Thomas L. Kay

Defendants.
On August 14, 2006 this matter came before the Court for hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Horton V. Bourne Partnership, Ltd., ("the Bourne Partnership") was
represented by Milo Steven Marsden. STC Holdings, Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit (together
"Defendants") were represented by Stephen G. Homer. Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted
memorandums of law and presented oral argument, after which the matter was submitted for decision.
After fully reviewing the parties' memorandums of law, the pleadings, and depositions, answers to
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interrogatories, admissions and other factual material from the record, and having heard the parties' oral
arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that it is in a position to rule on the
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and hereby rules as follows:
1.

The Court finds that, based on the materials the parties have submitted to the Court,

summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact. Accordingly, there is no issue left to try. Based on the
undisputed material facts, the Court finds that the Bourne Partnership is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
2.

The Court finds that in responding to the Bourne Partnership's motion for summary

judgment, Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Defendants did not identify particular paragraphs of the Bourne Partnership's statement of
facts that were controverted; nor did they provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute
supported by citation to relevant materials in the record. Pursuant to Rule 7, the Bourne Partnership's
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts are deemed admitted for purposes of this summary judgment
motion.
3.

The Court further finds that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Defendants, there is no genuine issue as to at least the following facts:
a.

The Bourne Partnership is in possession of and holds title to certain real property

located in Davis County, Utah, along Burke Lane west of Interstate 15 (hereinafter the "Burke Lane
Property"). The Burke Lane Property is more specifically identified by Tax I.D. # 080600004. Its legal
description is as follows:
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BEGINNING ON THE NORTH LINE OF BURKE LANE AT THE
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF LOT 1, BLOCK 34, BIG CREEK PLAT,
DAVIS COUNTY SURVEY, AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 40.0
RODS; THENCE EAST 35.50 RODS, MORE OR LESS TO THE
WESTERLY LINE OF A RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY; THENCE
SOUTHEASTERLY 834.0 FEET, MORE OR LESS ALONG SAID
RAILROAD; THENCE SOUTH 9.0 RODS TO THE NORTH LINE OF
BURKE LANE; THENCE WEST 82.0 RODS, MORE OR LESS TO
THE POINT OF BEGINNING. CONT. 16.19 ACRES.
b.

Defendant STC Holdings is a dba or trade name for Land Solutions, L.C, a Utah

limited liability company. Steve Glezos is the registered agent and sole member of Land Solutions, L.C.
c.

On or about June 15, 2004, the Bourne Partnership and Steve Glezos, acting as

STC Holdings, entered a contract for the purchase and sale of the Burke Lane Property. The contract
was made up of a written ''Purchase Agreement," that Defendants drafted, and two pre-printed
"Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract" forms, on which the parties had exchanged counteroffers
regarding price and a few other terms.
d.

The "Effective Date" of the Purchase Agreement was June 15, 2004.

e.

The Purchase Agreement provides that the price for the Burke Lane Property is to

be "$600,000, or $37,060 per net usable acre." The term "net usable acres" is defined in Section 2(a) of
the Purchase Agreement as follows:
The term "net usable acres" as used herein shall mean the gross number of
acres within the Property reduced by that portion of the Property which is
unusable because of easements, dedications of right-of-way for roadway
purposes of [sic] other purposes which would prevent the erection of any
improvements on that portion of the Property affected and which are
existing as of the date of the final Survey.
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f.

The Purchase Agreement further specifies deadlines for the parties to perform

their obligations under the contract related to determining whether any property is to be excluded under
the definition of "net usable acres."
g.

Paragraph 6 of the Purchase Agreement states that "within thirty (30) days of the

Effective Date of the Agreement," the Seller is to provide the Buyer with "a copy of any survey(s) of the
Property in the Seller's possession." The Buyer "may, at its sole cost, within ten (10) days of receiving
any such Survey(s), order an update of [sic] new Survey as Buyer may desire." Paragraph 6 further
provides that "[i]f buyer elects to update or enhance the Survey, it shall pursue completion of the same
with diligence."
h.

The Court finds that Defendants had only until July 25, 2004 (i.e., 40 days after

the Effective Date) by which to order an update of any existing survey or to order a new survey of the
Burke Lane Property.
i.

Paragraph 7 of the Purchase Agreement states that "Buyer shall give notice to

Seller of any matters contained in the Title Commitment of [sic] Survey to which Buyer objects."
Paragraph 8 of the Purchase Agreement states that "Seller shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of the
notice contemplated by paragraph 7 . . . to cure the Objections to the satisfaction of Buyer or elect no[t]
to cure the same."
j.

Paragraph 12 of the Purchase Agreement states that the transaction "shall be

closed on the Closing date at the office of the Title Company." Paragraph 12 defines "Closing date" as a
date within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the Feasibility Period, or satisfaction or waiver of the
feasibility conditions. Here, the Court finds that the last day for Closing was no later than July 13, 2005.

4

<n\*

k.

Paragraph 18 of the Purchase Agreement states that "[i]f closing does not occur

due solely to a default by Buyer, Seller shall retain the Earnest Money and all other deposits as
liquidated damages." And, paragraph 25 of the Purchase Agreement states that "[i]n any action arising
out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees."
1.

There is conflicting evidence regarding the date when Mr. Glezos first engaged

Ralph Goff & Associates ("Goff) to survey the Burke Lane Property. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Defendants for purposes of this motion for summary judgment, it appears that Mr.
Glezos engaged Goff "somewhere the week of June 20th of 2004," and asked them to survey the Burke
Lane Property.
m.

It was not until nearly one year later, June 6, 2005, that Goff representatives went

to the Burke Lane Property and performed fieldwork, and it was not until June 24, 2005 that the survey
was completed (the "Goff survey").
n.

The Goff survey plotted three areas it called "wetland areas": wetlands area 1,

consisting of 1.3139 acres; wetlands area 2, consisting of .0645 acres; and wetlands area 3 consisting of
.1385 acres.
o.

In plotting these "wetland areas," Goff did not do a wetlands delineation in

compliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act, The Rivers and Harbor Act, or regulations
promulgated by the Army Corp of Engineers under these statutes.
p.

Goff is not qualified by schooling, experience, or otherwise, to perform a

wetlands delineation in compliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act, The Rivers and
Harbor Act, or regulations promulgated by the Army Corp of Engineers under these statutes.
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q.

The Goff survey also plotted an area it designated as "Surveyed Easement for

Utah Power and Light." This area contained approximately Vi of an acre of ground that was not within
the legal description of any easement that appears in the state or county records.
r.

On July 7, 2005, Defendant "Land Solutions, L.C., or STC Holdings, or Steve

Glezos," executed an "Assignment of Purchase Agreement," pursuant to which Land Solutions, L.C.,
STC Holdings and Steve Glezos "assign[ed], transfer [red], and set over to 90th South Joint Venture,
L.C., or Assigns, all right, title, and interest in and to the Purchase Agreement dated June 15, 2004. . . ."
Glen R. Pettit executed the Assignment of Purchase Agreement as the authorized agent and sole member
of 90th South Joint Venture, L.C., a Utah limited liability company.
s.

On July 8, 2005, the Defendants sent the Bourne Partnership a letter telling the

Bourne Partnership that the closing documents had been executed and funds had been delivered to the
escrow agent. The letter stated that wC[t]he purchase price has been adjusted as defined in paragraph 6d
of the Real Estate Purchase Contract." Attached to the letter was a "Settlement Statement" showing
$449,888.58 as the "Contract Sales Price." All of the closing documents, including the Settlement
Statement, were executed by Glen Pettit, on behalf of 90th South Joint Venture, L.C.
t.

On July 8, 2005, the Bourne Partnership notified the Defendants that their

adjustment to the price was incorrect, and that their tender was insufficient.
u.

On July 15, 2005, Defendant STC Holdings filed a "Notice of Interest" on the

Burke Lane Property with the Davis County Recorder.
4.

Based upon these undisputed facts, the Court concludes and determines that Plaintiffs

motion for summary judgment is well-taken and should be granted.
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a.

The Court concludes that under the Purchase Agreement the burden was on the

Defendants, as Buyers, to establish that property was "unusable" and that an adjustment to the $600,000
purchase price was appropriate.
b.

In order to deduct property, the Defendants needed to show that the property was

"unusable because of easements, dedications of nght-of-way for roadway purposes of [sic] other
purposes which would prevent the erection of any improvements on that portion of the Property affected
and which are existing as of the date of the final Survey."
c.

Defendants made at least two property deductions that were not justified under the

language of the Purchase Agreement.
i.

First, Defendants deducted approximately 1.5169 acres as "wetlands."

However, there is no admissible evidence to support the determination that 1.5169 acres
of the Burke Lane Property is unusable because it is "wetlands." The only evidence
offered on this point is the Goff survey. However, to provide admissible evidence that
portions of the Burke Lane Property are wetlands, Goff would have to be qualified under
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to provide expert testimony on this topic. The
Court knows from its experience in cases involving the Legacy Highway that wetlands
delineations require highly specialized knowledge. There is nothing before the Court to
show that Goff is qualified to offer opinions on this topic. Indeed, it is undisputed that
Goff is not qualified to make a wetlands determination, and is not qualified to offer
expert testimony on this topic. In light of this, the Court concludes that there is no
evidence to support Defendants' deduction of approximately 1.5169 acres as "wetlands"
under the Purchase Agreement.
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ii.

Second, Defendants deducted approximately Vi an acre of property as a

"Surveyed Easement for Utah Power and Light." However, the undisputed facts are that
this Vi acre of ground is not within the legal description of any easement that appears in
the state or county records. There is no evidence in the record to support its exclusion.
The Court concludes that it should not have been deducted because there was no basis to
do so.
d.

The Court concludes that the Defendants also breached their obligations under the

Purchase Agreement with regard to when they were to obtain a survey and to provide it to the Bourne
Partnership. The Purchase Agreement required the Defendants to order a survey or an update of a
survey within 40 days after the Effective Date, and it required the Defendants to pursue completion of
the survey with diligence. Here, the Defendants essentially sat on their hands for a year, and then
provided the Bourne Partnership their survey just a few days before the last day for closing the
transaction. The Court concludes that the Defendants did not pursue completion of their survey with
diligence.
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY DECLARED AND ORDERED,
1.

That the Bourne Partnership's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;

2.

That because of Defendants' failure to tender the purchase price for the Burke Lane

Property required under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, the Purchase Agreement expired by its
terms on July 13, 2005;
3.

That the Bourne Partnership is the owner of fee title to the Burke Lane Property, and that

the Defendants and each of them has no right, title, estate or interest therein;
8

4.

That the "Notice of Interest" in the Burke Lane Property filed by Defendant STC

Holdings on July 15, 2005 is declared null and void; and
5.

That pursuant to paragraph 25 of the Purchase Agreement, the Bourne Partnership is the

prevailing party and is entitled to an award of its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The Bourne
Partnership shall serve an affidavit of its fees and costs by September 13, 2006. Defendants' objections,
if any, to the Bourne Partnership's affidavit shall be served and filed by October 13, 2006.

RKdavof %k*

DATED this M * vday of

2006.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered on the 8lh day of September, 2006, to
the following:

Stephen G. Homer
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088

4844-5863-5521\2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered via U.S. Mail, on the 19th day of September,
2006, to the following:
Stephen G. Homer
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HORTON V. BOURNE PARTNERSHIP,
LTD., a Utah limited partnership,

ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 050603171

vs.

Judge Thomas L. Kay
STC HOLDINGS, a Utah general
partnership; STEVE GLEZOS, an
individual; and GLEN PETTIT, an
individual,
Defendants.
050603171

VD19548327
STC HOLDINGS

On January 25,2007 this matter came before the Court for hearing on (1) Defendants' Motion to
Set Aside Judgment, Motion for Relief from Judgment, Motion for New Trial and for Other Relief
("Motion to Set Aside Judgment"), (2) Defendants' "Objections" to Proposed Award of Plaintiffs
Attorney's Fees and Demand for Trial on Attorney's Fees Issue/Claims ("Defendants' Objections"), (3)
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Glen Pettit from Litigation ("Motion to Dismiss"), and (4) Defendants'
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., Motion. The Horton V. Bourne Partnership, Ltd., ("the Bourne Partnership") was
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represented by Milo Steven Marsden. STC Holdings, Steve Glezos and Glen Pettit (together
"Defendants") were represented by Walter T. Keane. Plaintiff and Defendants submitted memorandums
of law and presented oral argument, after which the matter was submitted for decision. Being fully
advised in the premises, and for the reasons stated at the hearing the Court rules as follows:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Judgment is DENIED;

2.

Defendants' Objections are WITHDRAWN, pursuant to Defendants' representation at

the hearing;
3.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED; and

4.

Defendants' Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. Motion is DENIED.

DATED this iffi^day 0 f
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, 2007.

BY THE COURT:
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HONORABLfitHOMAS L. KAY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS was
hand-delivered on t h e / ^ day of March, 2007, to the following:

Walter T. Keane
Walter T. Keane, P.C.
2150 South 1300 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

4826-9710-8737\3
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